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ABSTRACT: 
 
Volatility has been a widely discussed subject in financial research and many papers consider it 
synonymous with the risk of an investment. However, further research has revealed that besides 
exhibiting the level of risk, volatility has more wide-ranging implications. Empirical evidence 
indicates that the forward-looking measures of volatility may have informational value over 
future equity returns. 
 
This thesis studies the relation between implied volatility and equity returns around FOMC 
interest rate announcements. The main purpose of this thesis is to examine whether FOMC 
announcements increase the level of information that implied volatility contains about future 
stock returns. The research framework is motivated by the findings of Du, Fung & Loveland 
(2018) about the increased return predictability in the banking sector. This thesis contributes to 
the existing literature by examining the information content of implied volatility in a market-
wide context. 
 
By using daily observations from 1995 to 2008, multivariate regressions are run in an attempt to 
explain stock returns by lagged changes in implied volatility and binary variables that identify 
FOMC announcement days. The possible impact of FOMC announcements on return 
predictability associated with implied volatility is studied by augmenting the model with an 
interaction variable. For further examination, daily changes in implied volatility are divided into 
quartiles so that it is possible to examine whether the magnitude of change in implied volatility 
impacts return predictability. Additionally, the sample period is divided into two subsamples so 
that any timely differences can be perceived. Finally, similar regressions are applied to the days 
surrounding the actual announcement days.  
 
The results of this thesis suggest that stock returns are positively associated with not only the 
lagged changes in implied volatility but also FOMC announcements in general. These findings 
are consistent with the previous studies. Regarding the hypothesized increase in return 
predictability, significant results are attained for certain subsamples and days following the 
FOMC announcements. Even though these results do not directly suggest that the findings of Du 
et al. (2018) apply in a market-wide context, this thesis provides qualified evidence that FOMC 
announcements have a positive influence on the predicting power of implied volatility. 
Therefore, this thesis motivates to examine the information content of implied volatility in 
future research as well. 
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Estimating the influence of uncertainty on asset returns has arguably been the very crux 
of investor behavior. Regardless of the model used in pricing assets or forecasting their 
returns, the financial risk appears to equal uncertainty. Theoretically speaking, this 
uncertainty means volatility, which is widely considered to equal the dispersion of a data 
set relative to its mean – that is, standard deviation. 
 
Volatility can be examined either as a derivation from a chosen time series, or as an 
implicit prediction of future uncertainty: this thesis treats the latter. On a global basis, 
the volatility indices of Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) are considered as the 
most apposite measures of implied volatility. The main CBOE indices, usually referred to 
as VIX and VXO, are indicators destined to gauge the expected volatility of the US stock 
market. The negative correlation between the stock market and these indices has been 
empirically established (Whaley, 2000; Carr & Wu, 2006). Furthermore, the existing 
literature indicates how the implied volatility of an index option reflects information 
about its price risk. Although neither VIX nor VXO is an investable instrument, their 
feasibility as indicators for equity return fluctuation has been widely acknowledged. 
(Giot, 2005; Carr & Wu, 2006; Banerjee, Doran & Peterson, 2007.) 
 
Previous studies find evidence of equity return predictability through implied volatility 
around events that incorporate idiosyncratic information important solely to certain 
stocks. However, only few papers have studied the information that implied volatility 
indices contain in an event-specific environment where information is relevant to all 
market participants. Thus, this thesis examines the informational role of market-wide 
volatility around macroeconomic news announcements, namely the interest rate 
decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). This is done by regressing 
post-announcement stock returns on pre-announcement changes in implied volatility. 
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1.1 Previous literature 
The core purpose of implied volatility indices is to reflect market expectations on future 
fluctuation in asset prices. As mentioned earlier, the CBOE has two main indices that are 
considered as benchmarks for equity market volatility. The initially formed volatility 
index, which is nowadays called VXO, is computed by utilizing option prices on the S&P 
100 (OEX) index. VXO rests strongly upon the Black-Scholes option pricing model, which 
will be separately treated in section 2.1. 
 
In 2003, the CBOE decided to alter their volatility index and back-calculate its values to 
1990 based on the historical option prices. Furthermore, the CBOE began disseminating 
prices for another volatility index, VIX. The new volatility index VIX is based on the prices 
of S&P 500 (SPX) index options and does not rely on any specific pricing model. Carr and 
Wu (2006), among others, report very strong positive correlation between the two 
indices. One can therefore conclude that both VIX and VXO represent the overall stock 
market volatility. Moreover, any character of VIX is ought to be present in VXO and vice 
versa. Should there be any exception to these conclusions, each index will be treated 
individually. This paper studies the information contained in VXO, which is why section 
2.3 provides a more profound treatment over the characteristics of VXO. 
 
Previous studies imply the mean-reverting nature of implied volatility. According to 
Whaley (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2007), volatility is not expected to move parallel with 
the stock market but to revert to its mean, VIX for example doing so in around 44 days. 
Furthermore, extensive evidence indicates how the behavior of volatility is asymmetric; 
volatility indices tend to react drastically (tepidly) to negative (positive) surprises in 
equity returns (Whaley, 2000; Giot, 2005). With reference to this thesis, the above 
findings are important. Before examining what kind of information does implied volatility 
include about future price movement, it is beneficial to understand the way implied 




The existing literature documents a significant relationship between market uncertainty 
and FOMC announcements. Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) report a decrease in implied 
volatility on the day of the announcement, which is later supported by, for example, 
Chen and Clements (2007). However, there are partly dissenting views on the roles of 
monetary policy surprises and mean reversion in the behavior of implied volatility 
around FOMC announcements (Vähämaa & Äijö, 2011; Chen, Krieger & Mauck, 2012). 
Chapter 5 examines these papers, among others, in further detail. 
 
When studying the informative nature of implied volatility around macroeconomic news 
announcements, theoretical framework tends to rest upon two well-established 
principles. First, it is expected that the options market, from which the data is being 
collected to compute implied volatility, contains more information than its underlying 
stocks (Cremers & Weinbaum, 2010). Second, the options trading volume is assumed to 
cluster around occasions that involve imperfect information and moral hazard (Cao & 
Ou-Yang, 2009). The above-mentioned findings endorse the idea of implied volatility 
containing heralds of future stock price movement upon macroeconomic news 
announcements. 
 
Apart from the computed indices, the informational role of volatility can also be 
inspected through volatility spreads (defined as the weighted difference in implied 
volatilities between call and put options with same maturity and exercise price) on 
individual stocks. Du, Fung & Loveland (2018) utilize this procedure while examining the 
predictability of stock returns within the banking sector. By regressing future bank stock 
returns on the implied volatility spreads preceding the FOMC meetings, Du et al. (2018) 
discover significant predictability compared to days when no meetings are being held. 
Furthermore, their findings are on par with the observations of Easley, O’Hara & Srinivas 
(1998) on the causal relationship between information asymmetry and option price 
deviation from put-call parity. However, Du et al. (2018) focus mainly on the banking 




1.2 Purpose of the study and research framework 
Previous research emphasizes the role of the options market as a venue for informed 
trading. For an investor willing to take a stand on future price movement, options appear 
attractive due to their mitigated short-sale limitations and hence higher leverage 
opportunities. Motivated by the findings of the information value contained in the 
options market, this paper examines the kind of information that implied volatility 
contains around FOMC announcements. More accurately, this thesis studies whether 
VXO incorporates more information about future S&P 100 returns around FOMC 
announcements than it usually does. This study is motivated by, for example, Du et al. 
(2018) and their findings on significant return predictability within the banking sector. 
 
To examine whether the occurrence of a FOMC meeting has an impact on the predicting 
power of VXO over future OEX returns, the following hypothesis is formed: 
 
H0: Stock return predictability related to implied volatility does not increase 
around FOMC meeting days. 
 
This thesis attempts to reject H0 by examining whether return predictability is 
significantly greater on FOMC meeting days compared regular trading days. More 
specifically, this is done by regressing OEX returns on the preceding changes in implied 
volatility and then examining whether the occurrence of a FOMC meeting affects this 
relationship. Rejecting H0 would support the assumption that index options and their 
implied volatilities are more informative around FOMC meetings than they usually are, 
justifying the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Stock return predictability related to implied volatility increases around 
FOMC meeting days. 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature by studying the event-specific 
relationship of implied volatility and stock returns in a market-wide context. 
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The sample period for this thesis covers data from 1995–2008. Following Du et al. (2018), 
there are two main reasons why the sample period is terminated at the end of 2008. 
First, due to the prevailing market circumstances at the time, the Federal Reserve started 
quantitative easing and thereby urged the FOMC to make no changes to the federal fund 
rate between 2008–2015. Second and consequently, the Federal Reserve faced a zero 
lower bound created by the near-zero target range for the federal fund rate. As a result, 
the Federal Reserve began to target their monetary actions at the long end of the yield 
curve, which is why market participants had no reasonable expectations for federal fund 
rate to change during the period. 
 
The chosen sample period is also a reason why this thesis examines the relationship 
between VXO and OEX instead of VIX and SPX. As mentioned earlier, it was not until 2003 
that the CBOE started computing the new VIX. Therefore, the new VIX is unsuitable for 
a thesis that covers data between 1995–2008. Furthermore, the prevailing consensus 
states that it is the large firms with substantial amount of debt and high dividend payout 
ratios that are more sensitive to interest rates. As the companies included in the S&P 
100 tend to be the largest and most established companies in the US market, it is 
reasonable to use S&P 100 data in an event-specific study that considers the interest rate 
decisions of the FOMC. 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. The following chapter covers implied volatility and its 
relationship with the stock market. After that, chapter 3 discusses the way monetary 
policy actions impact interest rates and hence asset prices. Theoretical diagnosis is 
concluded by chapter 4 that briefly treats the concept of market efficiency. Chapter 5 
emphasizes the extant literature and treats papers relevant to the chosen subject. After 
chapter 6 that presents the framework for empirical analysis, chapter 7 exhibits the 





Measuring the uncertainty associated with future stock price movement is a widely 
embraced way of examining future risk. However, as this uncertainty occurs at some 
point in the future, one must naturally treat it in a forward-looking and subjective 
manner. Therefore, the problem of flawlessly forecasting the fluctuation of stock prices 
is yet to be solved. 
 
Regarding the existent literature, it was initially assumed that stock returns are 
lognormally distributed with stationary variances, hence one could derive accurate 
estimates of future prices from historical stock returns. However, it quickly became to 
common knowledge that empirically assembled return distributions differ significantly 
from the lognormal ones (Officer, 1973). Still, even though there is no model that can 
predict the future, the market has absorbed a few methods for assessing future returns. 
 
One established approach is to compute implicit predictions of future volatility from 
realized standard deviations. These implied volatilities represent the expected deviation 
in the price of an underlying asset. Prior to more profound treatment of the 
characteristics of implied volatility, the following section examines the Black-Scholes 
option theory, which is widely recognized as the underlying theory of implied volatilities.  
 
 
2.1 The Black-Scholes option theory 
Since the early 1970s, the Black-Scholes option theory has arguably been one of the most 
established ways of pricing options and thus assessing their implied volatilities. Having 
been augmented by Merton (1973), the Black-Scholes theory has acted as an underlying 
theory for further development within the derivatives market (Cuthbertson & Nitzsche, 
2001). The Black-Scholes theory derives option prices from a differential equation, which 




1. Market participants have access to a riskless asset with a constant rate of return, 
namely the risk-free interest rate. 
2. The price of a stock follows a geometric Brownian Motion with constant expected 
return and volatility. 
3. During the validity of a given derivate instrument, its underlying stock does not 
pay out dividends. 
4. There are no arbitrage opportunities. 
5. The market is frictionless in a way that the transactions do not incur any fees or 
costs. 
6. Market participants can borrow and lend cash at the riskless rate. 
7. It is possible for market participants to short sell stocks. 
 
Owing to the assumptions mentioned above, one can presume that the return of a 
portfolio including a derivative and a stock equals to the risk-free interest rate. This risk-
free portfolio can be composed because the values of both assets in the portfolio are 
driven by the same factor – future fluctuation in the price of a stock. Given any short-
term time period, the prices of the two assets correlate negatively and thus any gain 
(loss) in one instrument is compensated by an equivalent loss (gain) in another one. 
 
The assumption of a stochastic process, namely the geometric Brownian Motion, is 
essential when examining the differential equation behind the Black-Scholes theory. 
Equation (1) exhibits that the change in the price of a stock ∆S relative to its current price 
S follows the standardized normal distribution Φ (0,1) with an average of μ∆t and a 




~𝜙(𝜇∆𝑡, 𝜎√∆𝑡). (1) 
 
Equation (1) is consistent with the findings of Itô (1944) about the stochastic component 
(the Wiener process) being the same for both assets in the abovementioned risk-free 
portfolio. Therefore, one can conclude that the return of a stock during a time period ∆t 
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is a sum of two parts: expected return μ∆t (drift rate) and the stochastic component σS∆z 
(variance rate): 
 
∆𝑆 = 𝜇𝑆∆𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆∆𝑧. (2) 
 
Considering equation (2) and the Black-Scholes assumption about no arbitrage 
opportunities, the total return of a portfolio must equal1 the risk-free interest rate r. In 
line with this perception, the Black-Scholes differential equation describes the price of 













− 𝑟𝑉 = 0. (3) 
 
The key finding of this equation (3) is that one can fully hedge the option position by 
selling or buying the underlying stock. Moreover, equation (3) denotes that there is only 
one appropriate price for the call (put) option c (p), which can be calculated with the 
formula introduced by Black and Merton (1973): 
 
𝑐 =  𝑆0𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑋𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) and (4) 
 











  and  
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇.  
 
In these equations: S0 is the current price of the underlying asset, X is the exercise price 
of the option, T is the date of expiration and function N(x) represents the cumulative 
 
1 If the total return of a portfolio exceeds the risk-free interest rate, investors could make riskless profit by 
borrowing cash to buy the portfolio. Conversely, should the portfolio return be less than the risk-free rate, 
arbitrage could be achieved by short selling the portfolio and simultaneously buying the risk-free asset. 
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distribution function for a normal distribution. In other words, N(x) is the probability for 
a Φ (0,1) distributed variable to be less than x, which in this formula refers to d1 and d2. 
 
Besides solving the partial differential equation introduced in equation (3), the Black-
Scholes pricing methods can be derived by utilizing the argument of risk neutrality. As 
each variable in equation (3) is independent from investor’s risk appetite, the option 
values computed with the Black-Scholes formula equal to the actual option values in the 
markets. This idea of risk neutrality has simplified the pricing of derivatives in the 
financial markets (Cox & Ross, 1976). For example, under the assumption of risk 
neutrality, the present value for the expected return E for a European2 put option is 
 
𝑝 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝐸, where (6) 
 
𝐸 = [max(𝑆𝑇 − 𝑋, 0)].  
 
Regarding call options, one can apply the Black-Scholes method also to American options 
as long as they do not pay out dividends. Furthermore, it is possible to extend the Black-
Scholes method to account for dividends by deducting the present value of future 
dividends from the price of an underlying stock. However, in this case the option must 
be European. Next, this thesis discusses the further characteristics of implied volatility. 
 
 
2.2 Implied volatility 
Regarding volatility as a term, it can be considered as a theoretical concept with multiple 
interpretations. As Black and Scholes (1973) indicate, one can treat volatility as a variable 
that follows the stochastic process and thus fits into partial differential equations. 
However, this idea is not flawless as more recent literature implies that despite constant 
maturity, volatility can vary depending on the current price and the exercise price of an 
 
2 Contrary to American options, the execution of a European option is limited to its maturity. 
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option (Rubinstein, 1985). This has led to a situation where alternative models have been 
discovered by, for example, altering the Black-Scholes model so that volatility correlates 
with the price of the underlying asset (Heston, 1993). 
 
It is also possible to gauge volatility through GARCH3 models that treat volatility as a 
variable that may correlate with other factors in the pricing model. As the commonly 
utilized models of (ordinary) least squares call for the given data set to fulfil the 
conditions of homoskedasticity4, GARCH models account for the varying error terms and 
compute individual estimates of the variances of each error term. GARCH models are 
particularly suitable for assessing volatility in a time series analysis. (Engle & Patton, 2001; 
Woolridge, 2013.) 
 
As discussed earlier, computing implicit predictions of future volatility from realized 
standard deviations is one established way of measuring future risk. Implied volatility is 
a measure of future price movement, which is computed from the current price of an 
option. One can therefore conclude that implied volatility is directly dependent on the 
assumptions used in the chosen option pricing model. Looking at the equations in 
section 2.1, this conclusion holds up also with the Black-Scholes pricing model. Following 
the stochastic process addressed by Itô (1944), volatility can be defined as a standard 
deviation of return provided that the return is calculated in a continuous manner. 
Furthermore, owing to the geometric Brownian Motion documented in equation (1), 
volatility is expected to relatively increase over time. 
 
However, it is essential to understand that the difference between implied and realized 
volatilities occurs whenever the market expects that future price movement will differ 
from historical patterns. Therefore, implied volatility shall not be considered as an 
explanatory factor of actual volatility. Furthermore, one cannot derive a function from 
 
3 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. 
4 If a data set is homoscedastic, the anticipated values of its error terms must always equal. If otherwise, 
the data set is considered heteroskedastic (Woolridge, 2013). 
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the Black-Scholes model that directly computes the value of implied volatility. In fact, 
implied volatility is the only variable in the model that cannot be directly observed. In 
other words, implied volatility is the value of volatility variable in the pricing model that 
leads to an option price that is in line with market expectations. (Hull, 2006.) 
 
Further examination of the Black-Scholes model and its idea of implied volatility shows 
that the implied volatilities of options with similar underlying assets and exercise prices 
are expected to be equal. This is, however, not the case as more recent literature 
indicates significant relationships between the three factors (Rubinstein, 1994; Dumas, 
Fleming & Whaley, 1998). 
 
Moreover, the Black-Scholes model presumes that the price of an underlying asset 
develops steadily with no discrete jumps at random times. However, when comparing 
the theoretical Black-Scholes prices to actual market prices, it is discovered that the 
model underestimates the probability of an out-of-the-money5 (OTM) option to turn in-
the-money (ITM) during its maturity. Then again, when the Black-Scholes model is 
utilized for options that are at-the-money (ATM), the computed prices concur with the 
actual market prices. (Rubinstein, 1985; Cuthbertson & Nitzsche, 2001.) 
 
To conclude, it has been discovered that the Black-Scholes model is inefficient in pricing 
options that are trading far from their exercise prices. However, when assessing the 
future volatility of an option during its maturity, implied volatility is still considered as a 
usable estimate. As the existing literature treats volatility as a variable rather than a 
constant, a rational investor should price options with a model that takes the stochastic 
nature of volatility into account. Regarding the predictive nature of implied volatility, 
empirical evidence verifies the correlation between implied and actual volatilities. More 
specifically, Latane and Rendleman (1976) suggest that despite the existence of factors 
affecting all options in a similar way, the implied volatilities computed with the Black-
Scholes model are correlated with actual standard deviations. However, as no model can 
 
5 A call (put) option is OTM if its strike price is more (less) than the current spot price and ITM, if vice versa. 
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fully predict the future, testing the prediction power of implied volatility is 
simultaneously testing of the current level of efficiency in the options markets. As this 
paper examines the informative nature of implied volatility, understanding the three 
levels of market efficiency is important. Thus, Chapter 4 concludes the theoretical part 
by briefly treating the observations of Fama (1970), among others. 
 
 
2.3 The original volatility index VXO 
The CBOE Volatility Index was originally drawn up to reflect investor’s expectations on 
short-term volatility. VXO is based on OEX options and aims to equal the average of the 
Black-Scholes implied volatilities on eight near-the-money options at the two closest 
maturities. In case the nearest maturity is no more than eight days, the next two 
maturities are utilized instead. At each maturity, the computation formula takes two call 
and two put options at strike prices that straddle the spot level. Next, the VXO 
computation formula averages the implied volatilities of both call and put options at 
each strike price, so that the spot implied volatilities can be interpolated. These implied 
volatilities are then further interpolated along the maturity dimension to create a 22-
trading-day volatility, which eventually constitutes VXO. 
 
Besides VXO, the CBOE maintains another implied volatility index VIX. Although the two 
indices differ in terms of computation, they have relatively similar characteristics. 
Moreover, it has been discovered that the two indices correlate positively and thus run 
almost parallel with each other. Carr and Wu (2006) compare the two indices and report 
the summarizing statistics and daily differences in table (1). Furthermore, table (1) 
presents the corresponding 30-day realized volatilities for both indices; RVol(SPX) for VIX 











Table (1) indicates that the realized sample mean of OEX exceeds the mean of SPX. 
Moreover, the sample mean of VXO is greater than the mean of VIX. This is mostly due 
to the trading-day conversion included in VXO computation. This conversion is related to 
the Black-Scholes model and will be discussed in section 2.4. Both implied and realized 
volatilities in table (1) incorporate modest positive skewness6 and excess kurtosis7, which 
is significantly greater for daily differences. The excess kurtosis may be related to 
discontinuous movements in index return volatility. These jumps in asset returns are 
examined by, for example, Eraker, Johannes & Polson (2003). Carr and Wu (2006) also 
report the t-statistics for the differences between indices and their respective realized 
volatilities. Between VIX and RVol(SPX), the t-statistic implies high significance at 14.09. 
The same statistic between VXO and RVol(OEX) is 6.72, which is highly significant as well. 
 
Furthermore, Carr and Wu (2006) document the cross-correlation between not only VIX 
and VXO but also their subsequent 30-day volatilities. As can be seen in table (2), both 
indices are strongly correlated with the realized volatilities of their underlying indices. 
On the other hand, the correlation coefficients of realized volatilities get close to zero 






6 The mean of positively skewed data will be greater than the median. 
7 Positive kurtosis means that the distribution of a data set has fatter tails than a normal distribution. In 
other words, the probability largely positive or negative results is higher. 
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In table (2), another matter worth noticing is the high correlation between the two 
volatility indices. VIX and VXO are positively correlated in both levels (0.98) and daily 
differences (0.86). Considering this and the previously established negative correlation 
between the implied volatility and the stock market, one can conclude that both VIX and 
VXO proxy the overall stock market volatility. For this thesis, this observation is important. 
Owing to the robust analogy between the two volatility indices, one can conclude that a 
given character of VIX may also be present in VXO and vice versa. Should there be a 
reason to depart from this conclusion, each index will be treated individually. 
 
As mentioned previously, the negative correlation between the stock market and 
volatility indices has been widely recognized. Dash and Moran (2005) study the 
correlation more in detail and establish the following: a major part of historical spikes in 
volatility can be explained by simultaneous bearish states within the stock market. This 
kind of negative correlation is depicted in figure (1) that follows the development of VXO 





Figure 1. The negative relation between VXO and S&P 100, 1995–2019. 
 
Besides the negatively correlating relationship, figure (1) illustrates its asymmetry; the 
correlation appears to be most robust when OEX is performing badly. Given this 
asymmetry, one could argue that instead of eagerness, VXO is a more accurate measure 
of general uncertainty among market participants. This finding is important when 
examining the informational role of volatility around events relevant to all market 





3 Monetary policy 
This chapter grounds the empirical part of this paper by examining the relationship 
between central bank monetary policy and the economy. Monetary policy decisions 
affect the economy in a relatively similar manner regardless of the market in question. 
Therefore, when discussing the common tools and schemes of monetary policy, this 
thesis considers the European Central Bank (ECB) as well. However, as the research 
question centers around the information role of implied volatility in the US market, most 
emphasis is put on the Federal Reserve and the monetary activities of the FOMC. 
 
Monetary policy is what the central banks do to control the amount money and credit in 
the market. The goal of monetary policy is to enhance employment rates, stabilize prices 
and thus support enduring economic growth. These objectives are commonly conveyed 
as macroeconomic variables (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005). However, the best possible 
impact on these variables is usually achieved through indirect methods. That is because 
the most extreme methods, namely the interest rate changes, have an impact only on 
the financial markets. Thus, central banks aim to achieve their monetary goals by altering 
economic behavior through indirect methods. (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005, ECB, 2011a.) 
 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of the transmission mechanism from interest rates to prices (ECB, 2011a). 
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In figure (2), the European Central Bank describes how interest rates affect asset prices 
through several transmission channels. Different impulses can be signaled through 
various individual links that may have separate effects on future price development. 
Policymakers must therefore acknowledge the entire transmission chain when making 
single decisions. Moreover, exogenous shocks described in figure (2) are also factors that 
should be avoided or at least considered prior to making monetary policy decisions. (ECB, 
2011a.) 
 
The description of transmission channel described in figure (2) is relevant to not only 
ECB but also other central banks. When a change in the official interest rate occurs, 
central banks alter their own operations. These operations usually refer to transactions 
where the central bank borrows money to other banks. The demand for additional funds 
from the central bank implies that either the public demand for a given currency has 
increased or the borrowing bank requires money to fulfil interbank liabilities or 
minimum reserve requirements8. However, there are some central banks, for example 
those in Australia, Canada and Sweden, that do not apply to the minimum reserve 
requirements. (ECB, 2011a.) 
 
Given the central bank controlling the interest rates on these transactions and thereby 
regulating the cost of liquidity, the banking sector is forced to pass on these costs to their 
end customers. Therefore, a change in money market9 rate is commonly followed by a 
change in the rates set by the banking sector on loans and deposits. Short-term interest 
rates may also vary due to the expected changes in the money market rates. Then again, 
rates for longer maturities are usually not affected as they rely on more longer-term 
trends, such as economic growth and inflation. 
 
 
8 Reserve requirements are the portions of deposits that banks are obliged to either maintain themselves 
or deposit at their designated central bank. 
9 Money market is a marketplace that consists of financial institutions that either borrow or lend money 
with a maturity of less than a year. 
23 
 
These changes in short-term rates are anticipated to have an influence also on the 
behavior of banks’ end customers. For example, an increase in short-term interest rates 
is ceteris paribus anticipated to hold back the common interest of financing consumption 
or investments with borrowed money. Furthermore, this increase in rates should be 
followed by a similar increase in savings rate and thus encourage consumers to save their 
income. Following these changes in willingness to consume or invest, the relationship 
between domestic supply and demand becomes relevant. For example, should demand 
exceed supply, an upswing in prices is anticipated to occur. Moreover, a change in either 
supply or demand will in the long run have an influence on the labor market as well. (ECB, 
2011a.) 
 
Besides interest rate changes and minimum reserve requirements, central banks can also 
influence the supply of bank reserves through open market operations that are 
synonymous with buying and selling of government securities. ECB (2011a) has 
categorized 10  these operations into main financing operations (MROs), longer-term 
operations (LTROs), fine-tuning operations (FTOs) and structural operations. ECB 
considers MROs as the most effective liquidity-providing reverse transactions owing to 
their one-week maturities and frequencies. 
 
On the other hand, central banks tend to implement LTROs with three-month (one-
month) maturity (frequency) when counterparties need refinancing for a longer time 
period. Finally, FTOs and structural operations are used to guide interest rates, dodge 
liquidity shocks and alter the structure of the financial system. Both FTOs and structural 
operations are based on the current liquidity situation, which is why they are mostly 
non-standardized. (ECB, 2011a; ECB, 2011b.) 
 
Rate changes, reserve requirements and open market operations are all utilized also by 
the central bank of the United States, The Federal Reserve System (FED). However, prior 
to examining the monetary actions of the FED, one should treat a section from ECB’s 
 
10 The categorization is performed based on the type, maturity and frequency of the transaction.  
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policy that is not similarly present in the US. That section involves standing facilities, 
which are to stabilize overnight liquidity and reflect the current status of the monetary 
policy. As stated by ECB (2011a), standing facilities inject or absorb liquidity with an 
overnight maturity on the initiative of counterparties. 
 
Counterparties have access to two kinds of facilities, namely the marginal lending facility 
and the deposit facility. The former has a function of obtaining central bank liquidity 
against the eligible assets, whereas the latter is used to make overnight deposits with 
the central bank. Given normal market conditions, it is not of banks’ interest to use these 
facilities as their rate is not favourable compared to market rates. However, ECB (2011a) 
has compiled data about the daily usage of standing facilities from January 1999 to 
August 2008, available in figure (3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Daily positions in the ECB standing facilities, from 1999 to 2008 (ECB, 2011a). 
 
Figure (3) verifies ECB’s observations about the redundancy 11  of standing facilities 
around normal market conditions. However, whenever the banking sector faces 
 




exceptional market conditions, the role of standing facilities as a controller of liquidity 
becomes more evident. This is because during financial turmoil, banks prefer to deposit 
their assets at the central bank rather than lending them to other market participants 
(ECB, 2011b). 
 
Understanding the behavior of standing facilities is useful for not only this thesis but for 
all other papers examining the relationship between implied volatility and equity returns 
around FOMC announcements. As standing facilities become relevant in turbulent 
market conditions, one may hypothesize that an increase in their utilization rate would 
lead to an upswing in implied volatility. This increase in implied volatility would 
consequently cause the stock market to decline given their negatively correlating 
relationship. Moreover, looking at the historical meetings of the FOMC, emergency 
meetings have for the most part occurred right around the turbulent market conditions. 
Therefore, there is arguably interaction between implied volatility, stock returns and the 
utilization rate of standing facilities. However, a more thorough conclusion- would 




3.1 The Federal Reserve and the FOMC 
Having discussed the general tools and schemes of global monetary policy, this section 
narrows the scope of examination and focuses on the FED and the interest rate decisions 
of the FOMC. The Federal Reserve System, created in 1915 by the Congress, is a central 
banking system of the United States. The FED (2016) divides itself into three salient units; 
a central governing Board, a decentralized operating structure of 12 Reserve Banks, and 
the FOMC. 
 
The Board of Governors is the governing unit of the FED. It involves seven members, 
namely the governors, who are appointed by the president and later verified by the 
senate. Besides promoting the public interest and formulating monetary policy, it is on 
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Board’s responsibility to monitor the operations of the 12 Reserve Banks. Then again, 
the Reserve Banks implement the FED strategy by, for example, overseeing the state 
member banks and lending money to depository institutions to ensure local liquidity. 
Third unit, the FOMC, will be separately treated later. 
 
It has been perceived that inflation, labor situation and long-term rates fluctuate over 
time in response to economic shocks. Moreover, the influence of monetary policy 
actions on economic activity and price development tends to occur with a lag. Therefore, 
the decisions of the FOMC should be in line with not only the FED’s long-term objectives 
but also its medium-term market outlook. (FED, 2016.) 
 
Following the Federal Reserve Act, the FED should strive for bolstering economic growth 
through maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. 
The FED’s main tool for this is to control the federal funds interest rate, which refers to 
the interest rate that banks charge other banks for lending them money from their 
reserve balances on an overnight basis. (FED, 2016.) 
 
The federal funds rate is mostly driven by open market operations, and it can therefore 
be used as an indicator of the credit availability in the economy. Furthermore, any 
change in the federal funds rate is commonly reflected in various other economical rates, 
such as short-term interest rates and foreign exchange rates. The target levels for the 
federal funds rate have been historically published by the FOMC. Next, this thesis will 
treat the FOMC and its role in the US monetary policy. 
 
Third unit of the FED, the Federal Open Market Committee, is to codify the nation’s 
monetary policy. This is synonymous with decisions regarding not only the open market 
operations, but also the size and nature of the FED asset holdings. The FOMC involves 
12 voting members, 7 of whom are members of the board. The main duty of the FOMC 
is to control the federal funds rate through open market operations. The FOMC treats 
these macroeconomic matters on a scheduled basis, having a regular meeting eight 
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times a year. In each meeting, the FOMC outlines its policy for the upcoming period 
before the next scheduled meeting. Under extraordinary conditions, such as turmoil in 
the financial markets, the FOMC may be gathered for an unscheduled meeting. (FED 
2016.) 
 
The FED (2016) has guided the FOMC that during each meeting, the following questions 
should be considered: 
 
1. How is the US economy likely to evolve in the near and medium term? 
2. What is the appropriate monetary policy setting to help move the economy over 
the medium term to the FOMC’s goals of 2 percent inflation and maximum 
employment? 
3. How can the FOMC effectively communicate its expectations for the economy 
and its policy decisions to the public? 
 
The FOMC strives for answering these questions through the following decision-making 
process. Prior to each meeting, the staff of the Federal Reserve Banks collect and gather 
information about the present state of the economy, which is then compiled into an 
overall summary, the so-called Beige Book12. Based on this summary and the economic 
forecasts provided by the Board of Governors, the FOMC participants formulate their 
initial opinions on the economic outlook. At the time of the FOMC meeting, a voting 
about future interest rates and other monetary actions is preceded by a presentation 
made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This presentation acts as a directive for 
the FOMC regarding the long-term objectives and short-term operating guidelines. (FED 
2016.) 
 
As per the initial Federal Reserve Act, the main tool for FED to put monetary policy into 
action is the open market operations. However, with reference to the subject of this 
thesis, the examination will from now on center around the FOMC’s decisions about 
 
12 The Beige Book is released to the public a week before the FOMC meeting. 
28 
 
changes in the federal funds target rate. As mentioned, the FED charges interest on credit 
they provide to banks and depositary institutions. This credit is provided through three 
different discount window programs: primary credit, secondary credit and seasonal 
credit. The FED has defined separate discount rates for each program. (FED, 2016.) 
 
The primary credit program involves short-term credit, which is directed to depositary 
institutions with satisfactory financial profile. The price for this kind of credit is expected 
to be above the present market rates. Should there be a financial institution that does 
not fulfil the requirements of the primary credit program, it can procure short-term 
credit from the secondary credit program, which is usually more expensive than the 
primary one. Finally, the seasonal credit program exists to provide liquidity for 
institutions that are small and have seasonal need for credit. The rate for this program 
equals the average of the market rates selected by the FED. (FED, 2016.) 
 
 
3.2 Interest rates and monetary policy 
When examining the market interest rates, it is important to distinguish the different 
components of nominal interest rate rn, which is the rate presented in the FOMC 
announcements. Allen, Brealey & Myers (2011) describe rn as a product of real interest 
rate rr and expected inflation i: 
 
1 + 𝑟𝑛 = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)(1 + 𝑖). (7) 
 
Considering equation (7), a change in the anticipated level of inflation should be 
proportionally reflected in the nominal interest rate, hence the real interest rate that 
consumers require is not affected by inflation. Bain and Howells (2005) take similar 
approach in equation (8) by assuming that besides rr and the inflation premium π, the 
nominal rate rn is driven by liquidity premium l and risk premium ρ: 
 
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑟𝑟 + 𝜋 + 𝑙 + 𝜌. (8) 
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In equation (8), π reflects the compensation related to the anticipated price increase 
during maturity, while l originates from the difference between short-term and long-
term interest rates. As lenders prefer the shortest possible maturity, they require 
compensation for any longer time periods. Thus, given no risk and constant prices, 
lenders that give up their possibility to spend require compensation amounting at least 
to the real interest rate rr. This kind of behavior is the reason behind the term structure 
of interest rates. (Bain & Howells, 2005; Allen et al., 2011.) 
 
As examined earlier, the central banks have an essential role in steering interest rates. 
Now that both the common tools of monetary policy and the structure of nominal 
interest rates have been presented, this thesis further examines the existing literature 
about interest rates and the underlying monetary policy. 
 
The study published by Lee (2006) observes the significant influence of the central bank 
monetary policy actions on interest rates. More accurately, the standard deviation of 
short-term interest rates appears to strongly response to the unexpected changes in the 
fed funds target rate. Also, the existing literature covers the relationship between the 
FED rate decisions and banks’ reserve-demand behavior. In 1994, the FED started to 
announce target rate changes that were implemented through the scheduled FOMC 
meetings. The idea of this change was to reduce uncertainty around the FED’s policy and 
thus decrease market volatility. The results confirm that since 1994, the target rate 
changes have been followed by lower interest rate volatility than before the policy 
change. (Bartolini, Bertola & Pratti, 2002.) 
 
Motivated by the term structure of interest rates shown in equation (8), Balduzzi, Bertola 
& Foresi (1997) study whether the term structure is affected by the FED’s decisions about 
the short-term target rate. By establishing a model that accounts for the discrete changes 
in target rates when studying the behavior of the term structure, Balduzzi et al. (1997) 
discover that it is the expectations of changes in the target rate that drive the spreads 
between short-term rates and the overnight FED funds rate. 
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To conclude, empirical evidence indicates how the impact of the central bank policy on 
market rates is not constant but varies with the expectations of future policy rates. Given 
the fact that this paper studies the relationship between the pre-FOMC implied 
volatilities and post-FOMC equity returns, the findings mentioned above are not 
essential. It is, however, useful to fully understand the process described in figure (2): 
what is the complete impact of the central bank rate decisions on market interest rates 
and eventually, asset prices. 
 
 
3.3 The influence of interest rates on stock prices 
As an extension for the previous chapter, this section investigates whether interest rates 
have any role in asset price valuation and stock pricing. The modern financial literature 
presents multiple different models for stock pricing. However, as this thesis focuses on 
the relationship between the stock prices and the pre-meeting volatilities, it is not 
meaningful to go through each model. Thus, to present a brief overview of the factors 
possibly affecting stock pricing, only few models relevant to this context are being 
presented. 
 
One of the most well-known models is arguably the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
introduced by Sharpe (1964). The model is based on the idea of an asset having an 
expected rate of return E(ri), which is derived as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓). (9) 
 
Consistent with other asset pricing models, CAPM is centered around the risk-free rate 
of return rf. Considering equation (7), the risk-free rate of return is the sole variable that 
is directly dependent on the federal funds target rate. The other component in equation 
(9) is the market risk premium E(rm) – rf, which equals the return investors require on 
top of the risk-free rate when optimizing their risk-reward ratios. In other words, the 
market risk premium is the return of a portfolio that is subject to systematic risk only. As 
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each asset is exposed to different amount of market risk, CAPM multiplies the market 
risk premium by βi, which is the beta of the asset in question. 
 
As per CAPM, an asset is priced correctly if its return positions the asset on the security 
market line13. When considering dividends D, an equilibrium occurs if the CAPM-implied 







In equation (10), dividends are divided by the sum of the market price of the asset P and 
the earnings growth rate g (Bain & Howells 2005). Another pricing model driven by 
dividends is the dividend discount model (DDM) that treats the true price of stock V as 







In equation (11), variable k is important as it describes the correct discount rate for the 
given level of risk. Equation (11) depicts the basic model, which has been later altered 
to account for various other factors, such as constant dividend growth (Bodie, Kane & 
Marcus, 2014). However, these applications are sidelined with reference to the subject 
of this thesis. 
 
Should an investor plan to sell a stock after a certain holding period, dividends may also 
be used to determine the anticipated selling price of the stock in question. In other 
words, the total return of a stock can be considered as a sum of two parts: the difference 
between the purchase price and the expected selling price, and the present values of 
the expected dividends from that holding period. (Bodie et al., 2014.) 
 
13 Security market line (SML) is a visualization of CAPM, plotting different levels of systematic risk against 
the expected return of the market portfolio. 
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Following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), there are three scenarios where stock prices 
may be affected by the unexpected federal funds rate changes: the expected excess 
return for the given stock increases, the expected amount of future dividends decreases, 
or the expected real interest rates used to discount future dividends increase. However, 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) discover that the direct effect of real interest rates on stock 
prices is slender, whereas changes in excess returns or future dividends may have a 
significant impact on stock prices. 
 
These results, however, consider only the direct effects of interest rates on stock prices. 
Chen, Mohan & Steiner (1999) report significant results when studying the reaction of 
equity returns to changes in discount rates. As can be seen, the prevalent asset valuation 
methods tend to rely on expectations about future cash flows and discount rates. That 
being stated, one should consider whether these expectations are legitimate and how 
can one justify them. Therefore, the following chapter will treat these topics when briefly 




4 Market efficiency 
Allocating the ownership of the capital stock of the economy has been adopted as the 
primary role of capital markets. Therefore, a well-functioning market should be able to 
give accurate signals for resource allocation. In other words, within an ideal market, 
participants can allocate their wealth between different asset classes under the 
assumptions that their prices incorporate and reflect all information available at that 
moment. This principle was first introduced by Fama (1970), who states that a market in 
which asset prices always incorporate all available information is called efficient. 
 
Given all available information and an assumption of asset prices being immediately bid 
to fair levels, one can conclude that asset prices change solely when new information is 
injected into the market. This new information must, by definition, be unpredictable as 
any predictable information would be reflected in current asset prices. Furthermore, as 
asset prices are expected to be influenced by this information, the future development 
of these asset cannot be predicted. This is the underlying argument of a theory by which 
asset prices ought to follow a random walk. 
 
In their pioneering study, Kendall and Bradford (1953) attempt to forecast the stock 
market price behavior by utilizing the systematic components of stock market time series. 
However, their main finding is that forecasting is possible only when market-exterior 
information is involved. Authors refer to the concept of random walk by stating that 
when it comes to forecasting future stock prices, time series analysis as a method is as 
accurate as drawing lots. 
 
Should stock prices be determined rationally and with full access to all existing 
information, new information is the sole factor that drives stock prices that consequently 
follow random walk. If the price changes could be predicted, meaning that there exists 
information not yet incorporated in prices, market would be considered inefficient. 
Therefore, the notion of stock prices incorporating all available information is referred 
to as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). (Bodie et al., 2014.) 
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The EMH is a striking application of the theory of rational expectations, which was 
initially presented by Muth (1961). This theory treats the various economic situations in 
which the outcome fully or partially depends on what involved parties anticipate to 
happen in the future. With reference to future stock prices, investors strive for accurate 
forecasts by rummaging various sources of information, such as past price fluctuation 
and any patterns in it. At the time of an investment decision, investors go long (short) in 
stocks they believe to generate return higher (lower) than their respective averages. By 
doing so, investors bid up (drive down) the prices of the stocks they decided to buy (sell). 
The prices continue to change until each stock has equal risk-adjusted expected returns, 
that is the moment when market prices fully reflect investors’ beliefs on future price 
movement. Thus, all remaining factors that drive stock prices cannot be predicted, 
meaning that the prices ought to follow a random walk. It is important to notice that 
regardless of the form in question, the EMH asserts that prices should reflect only 
information that is available at the time. Whenever new information is injected to the 
market, stock prices are anticipated to change relative to that new information only. 
 
 
4.1 Three forms of market efficiency 
There exists a wide consensus among finance literature regarding the three forms of 
market efficiency. As per Fama (1970), the level of market efficiency can be distinguished 
by the degree of information incorporated in asset prices. Should the prices reflect only 
the kind of information that can be derived from existing trading data, the market is said 
to function under the weak-form hypothesis. This information can be, for instance, 
historical price patterns or trading volumes. Under the weak-form hypothesis, current 
prices fully reflect the historical information, hence investors cannot generate alpha by 
utilizing existing data in predicting future prices. (Fama, 1970; Bodie et al., 2014.) 
 
The semi strong-form hypothesis states that in addition to past price information, the 
price of a stock should reflect all other public information related to the firm in question. 
The information referred in this context may include fundamental data on the firm’s 
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production line, management, balance sheet composition, intellectual property or 
earnings forecasts. Therefore, any news on a certain company should not influence its 
stock price as it already reflects all publicly available information. 
 
Fundamental analysis of publicly available firm-specific information is a widely 
established method of security analysis. Therefore, the semi-strong form hypothesis, 
which assumes that all public information is already impounded into stock prices, has 
been under criticism. By investigating the relation between unexpected earnings 
announcements and abnormal stock returns, Rendleman, Jones & Latané (1982) report 
findings against semi-strong form hypothesis. However, most of the existing literature 
supports the hypothesis. even if a firm-specific occasion results in stock price changes, 
the market adjusts to new information so rapidly that fundamental analysis does not 
generate abnormal returns. 
 
The strong-form hypothesis is arguably the strictest of the three as it states that all 
information, whether it is available for public or insiders only, is incorporated in stock 
prices. As per the hypothesis, this insider information is not beneficial in predicting 
future price movement. Referring to the studies mentioned earlier, there is evidence that 
stock prices may not reflect all available firm-specific information. A widely referenced 
study by Jaffe (1974) documents that significant profits can be generated by trading on 
information that is not publicly available. Even though such insider trading is illegal, it 
illustrates the possibility of making a profit on information asymmetry. There is, however, 
strong evidence on market’s ability to almost fulfill the requirements of the strong-form 
hypothesis (see e.g. Jensen, 1969). 
 
 
4.2 Efficient markets and monetary policy 
Following the EMH, market participants are expected to respond only to announcements 
involving previously unknown information. Therefore, it is only the unexpected part of 
information that may shift prices. When it comes to monetary policy actions, there exists 
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a market consensus on their disposition and magnitude. At the time of a monetary policy 
announcement, actions that are in line with market consensus have no impact on stock 
prices. Then again, any deviation from this consensus is considered surprising and hence 
affects stock prices. The bigger the surprise, the bigger the adjustment in stock prices. 
Naturally, the direction of this adjustment depends on the prevailing market 
expectations. (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005.) 
 
The EMH can be applied also to stock options as options follow same principles with 
their underlying assets. For option market to be efficient, the pricing models should be 
appropriate, and each option should have an implied volatility that accurately describes 
their yet-to-be realized volatilities. In other words, implied volatility should fully reflect 
all information available at the time. However, Ederington and Guan (2005) document 
that the ability of an option to reflect available information and thus comply with the 
EMH is driven by its exercise price and moneyness. 
 
The existing literature has also alluded to market efficiency when examining what kind 
of an impact does the FED policy have on the stock market. It is embraced that the stock 
market tends to react positively on expansionary monetary policy actions. More 
specifically, it has been discovered that the federal funds rate is negatively correlated 
with following stock returns (Ang & Bekaert, 2007). Maio (2014) rests his work on this 
idea and utilizes the information associated with the federal funds rate when 
constructing dynamic trading strategies. In practice, these strategies increase the weight 
of riskier assets whenever the federal funds rate declines. Maio (2014) reports that these 
strategies generate significant returns and outperform the traditional buy-hold 
strategies that use leverage. Moreover, Maio (2014) exhibits that when it comes to 
predictors that are used in active trading strategies, the federal funds rate outperforms 
other alternatives. These findings further support the notion that FOMC announcements 




Considering this thesis, which studies whether pre-announcement changes in implied 
volatility contain any information about post-announcement stock returns, 
understanding the concept of efficient markets is important. If markets were efficient, 
any historical data such as changes in implied volatility should not be useful in predicting 
future stock returns. Moreover, given efficient markets, the information content of these 
changes should be the same whether there is a monetary policy announcement or not. 
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5 Literature review 
A comprehensive treatment of the chosen subject is possible only after the theoretical 
diagnosis. Thus, this chapter focuses solely on extant literature and approaches the 
matter inversely by first discussing the relationship between equity returns and FOMC 
announcements. Then, the behavior of implied volatility around FOMC announcements 
is inspected. Finally, the literature about the informational role of implied volatility 
around FOMC announcements is taken under examination. 
 
 
5.1 The relation between FOMC announcements and the stock market 
The existing literature documents how equity market reacts to FOMC announcements in 
a way that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing theory. Lucca and Moench 
(2015) report that since the 1980s, US equities have generated large excess returns in 
the 24 hours before scheduled FOMC announcements. It is discovered that these returns 
do not revert in following trading days and thereby compose a major part of the realized 
excess stock returns. However, Lucca and Moench (2015) note that there is a puzzle as 
these returns cannot be fully explained with factors such as undiversifiable risk, 
information leakage, liquidity or volatility. 
 
Thereafter, the pre-FOMC announcement drift has been under further research. Boguth, 
Gregoire & Martineau (2019) examine if the way the FOMC communicates has any 
impact on these returns. In 2011, the FOMC implemented its new communication policy 
by which it is to hold a press conference after every other scheduled meeting. Boguth et 
al. (2019) document that the pre-FOMC drift stems from the announcements that are 
accompanied with these press conferences. Later, Gilbert, Kurov & Wolfe (2020) support 
these findings by extending the sample to 2019 and exhibiting that the pre-FOMC drift 
disappears when no press conferences are being held. Furthermore, Gilbert et al. (2020) 
document that since 2016, the pre-FOMC drift has weakened also in announcements 
that are accompanied with press conferences. Finally, Ben Dor and Rosa (2019) report 
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that the pre-FOMC drift is limited to equity markets only. Even though these findings 
about pre-FOMC equity returns are important for this thesis, some remarks shall be 
made. First, it is worth noticing that this thesis covers data between 1995–2008, that is 
time before the new communication policy of the FOMC. Second, this thesis considers 
stock returns that are captured on the announcement days (or surrounding days) instead 
of the preceding 24 hours. 
 
When discussing the impact of prevailing monetary policy circumstances on equity 
market, a paper worth considering is the one published by Gu, Kurov & Wolfe (2018). 
They study the behavior of stock returns following FOMC announcements, especially the 
ones that are accompanied by the release of the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). 
In 2007, the FOMC started to publish projections for major three economic indicators 
after every other FOMC meeting. This publication is referred to as the SEP report, and 
Gu et al. (2018) examine whether its presence has an impact on the following stock 
returns. Figure (4) depicts their main findings: whenever FOMC announcements are 
accompanied with the SEP report, the subsequent equity returns are more positive. 
 
 




Even though Gu et al. (2018) sideline the role of implied volatility and study purely the 
behavior of stock returns amid FOMC announcements, the information contained in 
figure (4) is relevant to this thesis. Figure (4) confirms that stocks tend to generate 
positive returns after FOMC announcements. Given the negative correlation between 
stock returns and implied volatility, these returns should be accompanied with a 
decrease in implied volatility. In addition, figure (4) illustrates how stocks generate most 
return when monetary information is considered negatively surprising. 
 
Existing literature has been focusing mainly on the linkage between macroeconomic 
announcements and the equity pricing process, leaving room for studies related to 
implied volatility. Motivated by this literature gap, Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) study 
the impact of scheduled FOMC meetings on stock market uncertainty, measured by the 
old S&P 100 VIX. By regressing changes in implied volatility on dummy variables 
identifying the FOMC announcement time frames14 , they find that implied volatility 
increases (decreases) prior to (on the day of) the scheduled announcement. 
Furthermore, contrary to other macroeconomic news releases, FOMC announcements 
are not preceded by sudden jumps in implied volatility. By supporting the existence of 
the tripartite relationship between implied volatility, FOMC announcements and stock 
market behavior, these results are relevant to this thesis. 
 
Chen and Clements (2007) base their study upon the findings of Nikkinen and Sahlström 
(2004) and examine the behavior of VIX around FOMC announcements. However, the 
two studies report partly differing results. While both studies document a decrease in 
implied volatility on the FOMC announcement day, contradiction occurs in the pre-FOMC 
behavior of implied volatility. Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) report an increase in VIX 
prior to the announcement whereas Chen and Clements (2007) do not support this 
notion. This is due to the mean-reverting nature of VIX, meaning that the return on VIX 
is seen to be dependent on its current level. 
 
 
14 Not only the announcement days but also the surrounding days (t-1 and t+1). 
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Later, Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) extend the findings of Chen and Clements (2007) by 
regressing daily VIX changes on various FOMC variables and thus establishing the bearing 
of the FED’s policy decisions on market uncertainty. At the time publication, their study 
had novelty value in three different aspects. First, they examined the influence of 
monetary policy shocks on stock market uncertainty by separating surprising decisions 
from all FOMC decisions. This separation was done by utilizing the daily changes in fed 
funds futures contracts. Second, they presumed that scheduled and unscheduled 
meetings have different effects on market uncertainty, which is why they divided all 
FOMC meetings into two subsamples. Finally, motivated by previous studies, their 
examination accounted for the potential cyclical variation in the relationship between 
policy decisions and implied volatility. (Vähämaa & Äijö, 2011.) 
 
Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) document how implied volatility is affected by monetary policy 
decisions. Furthermore, they agree with Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) and Chen and 
Clements (2007) about the post-FOMC decrease in implied volatility. However, due to 
the separation of policy shocks into positive and negative surprises, they perceive how 
implied volatility is mostly driven by negative15 surprises that are to reduce general 
uncertainty. Moreover, the results of Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) suggest that it is not only 
scheduled but also unscheduled meetings that have an impact on implied volatility. 
 
The link between scheduled FOMC meetings and implied volatility has also been studied 
by Chen et al. (2012). Their first results confirm the findings of Nikkinen and Sahlström 
(2004), Chen and Clements (2007) and Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) about the significant 
decrease (-2.74% on average) in implied volatility on scheduled FOMC meeting dates. 
Therefore, one can conclude that by declaring scheduled interest rate decisions, the 
FOMC notably unloads the prevailing market uncertainty. However, Chen et al. (2012) 
counter the existing findings in two ways. First, they suggest that the decrease in VIX is 
present for the full sample and thus does not depend on the prevailing monetary policy 
 
15 Vähämaa and Äijö (2011) considered target rate surprise to be negative, if the rate increase (cut) was 
smaller (greater) than expected. 
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stance. Second, Chen et al. (2012) differ by not recognizing the influence of policy 
surprises on implied volatility. In other words, Chen et al. (2012) reckon VIX as a proxy 
that captures pure uncertainty rather than information. This perception about the 
insignificant role of policy surprises on decrease in implied volatility is indirectly 
countered by Gu et al. (2018), as depicted in figure (4). 
 
It is also Gospodinov and Jamali (2012) that study the way implied volatility reacts to 
FOMC announcements. By separating the expected and surprise elements of each FOMC 
announcement, Gospodinov and Jamali (2012) report that implied volatility does not 
respond to the expected component of a target rate change. On the other hand, the 
impact of the surprise component on implied volatility is reported to be positive and 
significant. This observation is inconsistent with other presented papers that report a 
decrease in implied volatility following FOMC announcements. 
 
The mechanisms through which the release of macroeconomic news affect financial 
markets have also been studied by Chan and Gray (2018). Besides other announcements, 
Chan and Gray (2018) examine FOMC meetings and document negative jumps in implied 
volatility following the announcements. This is consistent with the notion that option 
prices contain heightened volatility prior to a forthcoming announcement. In addition, 
Chan and Gray (2018) exhibit that the magnitude of these jumps is a function of the 
surprise element in the announcement, as earlier suggested by Vähämaa and Äijö (2011). 
This finding contrasts the conclusions made by Chen et al. (2012). 
 
These findings on post-FOMC stock returns and implied volatility are important when 
inverting the angle of approach and studying whether pre-FOMC implied volatility 
incorporates event-specific information about future stock returns. Should implied 
volatility react in a systematic manner surrounding macroeconomic news 
announcements, one could expect that given the negative correlation between implied 
volatility and stock returns, this pattern could provide some information on the 
subsequent equity returns as well. 
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5.2 The information content of option trading 
The influence of the options market on the way stocks react to new information has been 
thoroughly investigated. Initial studies put emphasis on options listing status, and the 
informational linkage between options trading volume and equity markets became 
prevalent shortly after. Easley et al. (1998) discover that owing to a pooling equilibrium 
scenario, traders with superior information may perform their transactions in the 
options market and hence turn them informative for the future movement of stock 
prices. However, associating options trading volume with informed trading often calls for 
high-frequency options data and may thereby lead to proprietary limitations (Cao, Chen 
& Griffin, 2005; Pan & Poteshman, 2006). 
 
Acknowledging these limitations, Lei, Wang & Yan (in press) shift focus from options 
trading volume to option pricing effects. More accurately, Lei et al. (in press) employ the 
spread between call and put implied volatilities to study the implication of options 
trading on the way stocks response to earnings announcements. By dividing each month 
into six five-day intervals, Lei et al. (in press) report a gradual increase in implied volatility 
spreads when approaching the earnings announcement. Furthermore, they suggest that 
cumulative abnormal implied volatility spreads have predicting power over subsequent 
stock returns amid earnings announcements. These findings together with other related 
papers (see e.g. Jin, Livnat & Zhang, 2012; Atilgan, 2014) endorse the idea of informed 
traders steering the options market prior to earnings announcements. 
 
In addition to earnings announcements, the informational role of implied volatility has 
also been studied prior to other firm-specific events such as corporate share repurchase 
announcements. Using a sample of 2256 share repurchase announcements between 
1996–2012, Hao (2016) studies the development of implied volatility spreads before 
their respective announcements and discovers abnormally large spreads immediately 
prior to announcements. Furthermore, Hao (2016) reports that these volatility spreads 
have informational value over stock returns on the announcement days. Similar results 
have been obtained also for other firm-specific occasions such as mergers and 
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acquisitions (Chan, Ge & Lin, 2015) and stock splits (Ghargori, Maberly & Nguyen, 2017). 
Again, these findings support the notion that implied volatility contains information 
about future equity returns, at least on a firm-specific level. 
 
As previous studies report evidence of equity return predictability from the options 
market around firm-specific events, Du et al. (2018) examine whether this perception 
holds also around a macro-level event such as FOMC announcement. However, due to 
the differences in sensitivity to interest rate across industries, their paper focuses solely 
on stock returns of the banking sector16. Therefore, also the measure of implied volatility 
is adjusted to depict only the banking sector by focusing on implied volatility spreads. 
These spreads are defined as the weighted difference in implied volatilities between call 
and put options with equal maturities and exercise prices. Finally, Du et al. (2018) 
examine whether the return predictability is greater around FOMC announcements that 
are surprising. This is done by utilizing federal funds futures and the related approach 
initially presented by Kuttner (2001) and later employed by Bernile, Hu & Tang (2016). 
 
Du et al. (2018) exhibit significant returns when constructing a hedge portfolio based on 
the implied volatility spreads preceding the FOMC announcements. For the full sample, 
risk-adjusted return for the hedge portfolio is 28.6 basis points (bps). In addition, their 
results indicate the positive relation between return predictability and the magnitude of 
surprise in macroeconomic announcement. For the hedge portfolio constructed from 
surprise rate changes, the risk-adjusted return is 112.1 bps. To conclude, Du et al. (2018) 
document that compared to days without FOMC announcements, implied volatility 
predicts stock returns to a greater degree when there is an announcement by the FOMC. 
Furthermore, they report that this predictability is driven by the announcements that 
are considered surprising. This is consistent with the findings of Bernile et al. (2016). 
 
 
16 Du et al. (2018) reckon firms within the banking sector to be sensitive to interest rates given notable 
differences in the maturity composition of their balance sheets. 
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It is important to distinguish the differences between the papers published by Du et al. 
(2018) and Lucca and Moench (2015). Lucca and Moench (2015) document significant 
pre-FOMC returns and suggest that these unconditional excess returns are not directly 
associated with the actual decisions of the FOMC. Then again, Du et al. (2018) measure 
the effect of the actual policy decision and focus on the realized returns captured during 
the announcement, that is before and after the actual announcement. Furthermore, Du 
et al. (2018) exhibit information revelation in the options market on the day before the 
announcement, meaning that the options market would predict stock returns the FOMC 
decision. 
 
Even though the findings of Du et al. (2018) are based solely on the implied volatility 
spreads of options associated with banking sector, one can, by implication, utilize them 
in a market-wide environment. Option trading around FOMC meetings has predicting 
power not just for bank stocks, but for each stock that is sensitive to interest rates. Thus, 
this thesis studies whether implied volatility can predict equity returns also when both 
variables are detached from the banking sector and examined in a market-wide context. 
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6 Data and methodology 
As outlined in section 1.2, this thesis studies whether implied volatility contains more 
information about future stock returns around FOMC interest rate announcements than 
it usually does. The empirical examination is grounded by this chapter, which presents 
the data and methodology used. Section 6.1 exhibits the collected data set and its 
characteristics. Thereafter, section 6.2 presents the empirical methodology and treats 
the chosen research hypotheses. 
 
 
6.1 Data description 
This thesis puts most emphasis on stock returns and changes in implied volatility, hence 
the data set contains daily values of the two market-wide indices, VXO and OEX. These 
indices measure implied volatility and equity returns, respectively. The data set also 
accounts for the event study-like environment by not only containing changes in the fed 
funds target rate, but also distinguishing the three-day windows around FOMC 
announcements. Finally, the changes in implied volatility are divided into quartiles and 
treated in separate subgroups, that is the three-day windows around FOMC 
announcements. 
 
The data is collected from Refinitiv, a database formerly provided by Thomson Reuters 
yet later renamed as the Blackstone Group LP acquired majority of the Thomson Reuters 
Financial & Risk data business. With reference to the monetary policy data, the 
development of the fed funds target rate is provided by Refinitiv as well. The FOMC 
meeting calendar, especially the meeting days when no target rate changes were made, 
is collected from a database maintained by the Research division of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis (FRED). 
 
As justified in section 1.2, the sample period covers data from 1995–2008 for two 
reasons. First, due to the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve made no 
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changes to its target rate between 2008–2015. Second and consequently, there were no 
reasonable expectations for target rate to change during that period, and thus the FOMC 
announcements after 2008 are not comparable with the ones preceding the period of 
quantitative easing. Regarding the chosen sample period, there are nine daily 
observations that are omitted as their respective 3-day time windows overlap each other. 
Furthermore, as this thesis considers changes in VXO as a lagged variable, the first pair 
of observations is omitted from the empirical examination. Besides these notices, there 
are no other limitations regarding the collected data set. Table (3) presents the 
descriptive statistics for VXO, OEX and their respective daily changes. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of VXO and OEX from January 1995 to December 2008. All changes 
are of logarithmic nature. These statistics include all daily observations from the sample period. 
Out of the total 3653 daily observations, nine are omitted as their three-day time windows 





The data sample consists of 3644 daily observations of VXO and OEX between January 1. 
1995 and December 31. 2008. Table (3) exhibits that for both indices, the average daily 
change is close to zero. Furthermore, table (3) reports how the absolute value of 
maximum daily change in volatility (53.23 %) is greater than the respective minimum 
value (35.52 %). This finding supports the results of Giot (2005) about the asymmetric 
characteristics of volatility. Table (3) also confirms that daily changes in implied volatility 
are more drastic than the daily returns of the stock market. This is widely acknowledged 
in existing literature and is caused by the fact implied volatility measures uncertainty. 
 
Statistics Level Change
Index VXO OEX VXO OEX
Number of observations 3 644 3 644 3 643 3 643
Mean 21.85 539.41 0.03 % 0.02 %
Median 21.34 560.90 0.00 % 0.02 %
Minimum 9.05 214.20 -35.52 % -9.19 %
Maximum 87.24 832.65 53.23 % 10.66 %
Standard deviation 9.44 139.39 6.30 % 1.25 %
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Figure (5) displays the development of the FED funds rate during the sample period 
1995-2008. The sample period incorporates 132 FOMC meetings and 53 rate changes in 
total, of which 25 (28) are positive (negative). Thus, 79 meetings result in no changes to 
FED funds rate.  
 
 
Figure 5. The development of the FED funds target rate during the sample period 1995–2008. 
 
The FED funds rate varies significantly during the sample period. Between 1995 and 1998, 
the FED funds rate fluctuates around 5 % without any notable trends in its development. 
In 1999, the target rate increases gradually since the US economy is performing well. 
Regarding this sample period, the FED funds rate peaks at 6.5 % in May 2000. The US 
economy enters recession shortly after, which is why the FOMC starts to aggressively 
lower the target rate. Between June 2004 and June 2006, the FOMC executes a full cycle 
of rate increases from 1.00 % to 5.25 %. The target rate stands at 5.25 % for over 12 
months, until the FOMC starts executing rate cuts in 2007. Between September 2007 
and December 2008, the FOMC combats recession by conducting easing monetary policy, 
that is decreasing the FED funds rate from 5.25 % to 0.25 %. 
 
The FED funds rate is further examined in figure (6) by plotting the nominal rate changes 
against the daily OEX returns of the FOMC meeting days. During the sample period 1995-
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2008, there are only few spikes in daily OEX returns on the FOMC meeting days. A thing 
worth noticing is that most of these spikes occurs at the time of recession (either 2001 
or 2008) and are preceded by rate cuts. Regarding this thesis, it is of great interest to 
examine whether these rate cuts and their following stock returns could have been 
foreseen by utilizing the preceding changes in implied volatility. 
 
 
Figure 6. Changes in the FED funds rate plotted against the same day OEX returns, 1995–2008. 
 
The final figure that treats the FED funds rate data is Figure (7), which represents the 
distribution of different FED funds rate changes and their respective same day OEX 
average returns. During the sample period, the most extreme rate cuts (-0.75 %) are 
followed by a same day return of 2.88 % on average. Other rate cuts (-0.5 % and -0.25 %) 
yield smaller yet still positive returns (0.39 % and 0.25 % respectively). A bit surprisingly, 
also the returns following rate increases (0.25 % and 0.5 %) are slightly positive (0.31 % 
and 0.47 % respectively). Given no rate changes, OEX yields a minor daily return of 0.16 % 
on average. To conclude, the stock market tends to react positively on new information 
stemming from FOMC meetings. Moreover, changes in the FED funds rate appear to be 
negatively correlated with the same day OEX returns. In other words, big rate cuts tends 
to generate the best average stock returns. These findings are on par with Du et al. (2018) 




Figure 7. Distribution of the FED funds rate changes and daily OEX returns, 1995–2008. 
 
As mentioned, the sample period includes a total of 132 FOMC meetings. Motivated by 
previous studies, this thesis divides the meetings into two categories. The first category 
incorporates all scheduled FOMC meetings. By standard, the FOMC has meetings eight 
times a year. The second category includes the unscheduled meetings, that is the 
conference calls. Table (4) presents descriptive statistics related to FOMC meetings. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of FOMC meeting days, 1995–2008. The average OEX return is 
computed by taking an arithmetic mean of daily logarithmic returns. (Un)scheduled meetings 
are the ones (not) held according to the meeting calendar. Non-meeting days incorporate all days 




Panel A: All meetings
Number of observations 111 21
Average OEX daily return 0.31 % 0.15 %
Panel B: Meetings 1995-2001
Number of observations 56 8
Average OEX daily return 0.27 % 2.17 %
Panel C: Meetings 2002-2008
Number of observations 55 13
Average OEX daily return 0.35 % -1.10 %
Panel D: Non-meeting days
Number of observations 3 510 3 510
Average OEX daily return 0.01 % 0.01 %
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Out of the 132 total meetings, 111 are organized according to schedule. By dividing the 
sample period into two halves, one can verify that these scheduled meetings are evenly 
distributed across the 14-year period. For both subsamples (Panel B and Panel C), the 
average daily stock return is about the same (0.27 % and 0.35 % respectively). By nature, 
the average daily return for all scheduled meetings (0.31 %) is nearly the same as well. 
Differences occur when examining the unscheduled meetings. These 21 meetings are 
not evenly distributed across the sample period as they are not tied to the FOMC 
meeting calendar. Moreover, contrary to the scheduled meetings, table (4) reports how 
the average OEX return following unscheduled meetings varies notably between the 
subsamples. For the first (last) seven years of the sample period, the average daily OEX 
return is 2.17 % (-1.10 %). It is worth noticing that none of the 21 unscheduled meetings 
involve rate increase, whereas rate cut is present in five of the observations. Finally, table 
(4) reports the days without FOMC meetings in Panel D. By nature, the number of 
observations (3512) without FOMC meeting represents most of the entire population. 
 
 
6.2 The impact of FOMC events on return predictability 
The methodology of this study is motivated by the empirical framework implemented 
by Du et al. (2018). Furthermore, this study rests upon the idea of VXO reflecting 
investors’ beliefs on future price development and general uncertainty. By extracting 
individual three-day samples around each FOMC meeting, this thesis examines whether 
recent changes in implied volatility can predict future stock returns. The general 
framework is presented in figure (8) that demonstrates the three-day window around 





Figure 8. The generic framework for empirical analysis. 
 
As figure (8) illustrates, the main purpose of this thesis is to model a relation between 
changes in the level of uncertainty and subsequent stock returns. The change in the level 
of uncertainty is measured by calculating daily changes in VXO a day before each FOMC 
meeting (t-1), whereas the daily returns of OEX are used to capture the following stock 
market reaction. As presented in section 1.2, the hypotheses of this thesis are formed as 
follows: 
 
H0: Stock return predictability related to implied volatility does not increase 
around FOMC meeting days. 
 
This study attempts to reject H0 and thus support the following alternative hypothesis 
about the impact of FOMC meetings on stock return predictability: 
 
H1: Stock return predictability related to implied volatility increases around 
FOMC meeting days. 
 
In practice, the empirical research is conducted by regressing day t equity returns on 
preceding t-1 changes in implied volatility. After the VXO variable is lagged, a dummy 
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variable is added into the regression to indicate days when FOMC announcements are 
made. Thus, main analysis is conducted by utilizing the following formula: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(ΔVXO𝑡−1) + 𝛿1(𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶) + 𝛿2(𝐷𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶) + 𝑡+𝑛, (12) 
 
where 
Return t = logarithmic daily return of OEX, 
α = intercept term, 
∆VXO t-1 = logarithmic daily change in VXO, 
D FOMC = value 1 for FOMC announcement dates, 0 otherwise, 
D VXO x FOMC = interaction variable between lagged volatility and FOMC meetings, 
ε t+n = residual return not reflected in implied volatility. 
 
Most emphasis is put on the examination of δ 2 as its positive significance would provide 
support against H0. Contrary to the study conducted by Du et al. (2018), this thesis 
follows Chen et al. (2012) and assumes the behavior of implied volatility is independent 
from the content of the meeting. Therefore, the models do not include variables that 
measure the level of surprise in each meeting. 
 
Besides the main regression in equation (12), this paper carries over the 3-day time 
window by one day and regresses t+1 OEX returns on day t changes in implied volatility. 
That is because the existing literature documents habitual decrease in implied volatility 
on FOMC announcement dates as well as negative correlation between implied volatility 
and stock returns. 
 
Motivated by previous studies, the empirical analysis accounts also for the two kinds of 
FOMC meetings and examines whether the predicting power of implied volatility is 
different around FOMC meetings that are not held according to the initial schedule. As 
mentioned, the initial meeting schedule of the FOMC incorporates eight meetings a year. 
Thus, each meeting outside this schedule is considered unscheduled. The possible 
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difference in scheduled and unscheduled meetings is examined by performing another 
regression that designates two dummy variables, together with their respective 
interaction variables, to indicate the two kinds of meetings. This method results in a 
following formula: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(ΔVXO𝑡−1) + 𝛿1(𝐷𝑠) + 𝛿2(𝐷𝑢𝑠) + 𝛿3(𝐷𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝑆) +
                     𝛿4(𝐷𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝑈𝑆) + 𝑡+𝑛, (13) 
 
where 
D s = value 1 for scheduled meetings, 0 otherwise, 
D us = value 1 for unscheduled meetings, 0 otherwise, 
D VXO x S = interaction variable between lagged volatility and scheduled meetings, 
D VXO x US = interaction variable between lagged volatility and unscheduled meetings. 
 
In each model, the non-meeting days are considered as the reference group as there is 
no dummy variable that explicitly represents them. Finally, the main regression 
presented in equation (12) is altered so that instead of the FOMC meeting days, the 
dummy variable accounts for all days within the 3-day time windows (from t-1 to t+1): 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(ΔVXO𝑡−1) + 𝛿1(𝐷3−𝐷𝐴𝑌) + 𝛿2(𝐷𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 3−𝐷𝐴𝑌) + 𝑡+𝑛, (14) 
 
where 
D 3-DAY = value 1 for days within the 3-day time windows, 0 otherwise, 
D VXO x 3-DAY = interaction variable between lagged volatility and three-day time windows. 
 
These regressions are applied to the sample of 3642 daily observations. As mentioned, 
it is of main interest to study the significance of the chosen interaction variables. For 
further examination, this thesis divides daily changes in implied volatility into quartiles. 
Following this classification, same regressions are applied to four subgroups to examine 
whether the magnitude of the preceding change in volatility correlates with the degree 
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of return predictability. Finally, the sample period is chronologically divided into two 
seven-year subsamples so that any timely differences can be perceived. 
 
Table (5) compiles the descriptive statistics for daily changes in implied volatility. Panel 
A exhibits the full sample of 3642 observations and illustrates how the daily changes in 
VXO are moderate, only 3 bps on average. Furthermore, Panel A presents the descriptive 
statistics for the full sample quartiles. Quartile 1 contains days with big declines in 
implied volatility, whereas quartile 4 consists of days with sharp daily increases. Quartile 
2 (3) is the quartile right below (above) the full sample median. In quartile 4, the average 
change (7.81 %) is more positive than the average change is negative for quartile 1 (-
7.26 %). For quartiles 2 and 3, the average daily changes are -1.71 % and 1.27 % 
respectively.  
 
Table 5. Daily changes in implied volatility between 1995–2008. Average change is computed by 
taking an arithmetic mean of daily logarithmic changes. Panel A presents all observations that 
are considered in empirical examination. Panel B consists of same observations, yet it categorizes 




Panel B in table (5) highlights differences between the categorized observations. 
Between 1995-2008, the average (median) daily decrease in VXO is -2.27 % (-1.91 %) on 
FOMC meeting days. The decrease in implied volatility is not bounded by the meeting 
Average Median Std. dev. N
Panel A: Full sample
All observations 0.03 % 0.00 % 6.30 % 3 642
Quartiles:
(1) -7.26 % -6.12 % 3.90 % 910
(2) -1.71 % -1.70 % 1.02 % 911
(3) 1.27 % 1.15 % 0.99 % 911
(4) 7.81 % 6.35 % 4.82 % 910
Panel B: Categorized observations
FOMC meeting days -2.27 % -1.91 % 6.69 % 132
Days before FOMC meetings 0.29 % 0.45 % 6.35 % 132
Days after FOMC meetings -0.59 % -1.37 % 6.73 % 132
Days outside FOMC meetings 0.13 % 0.00 % 6.24 % 3 246
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days as the average daily change for the days following FOMC meetings is also negative 
(-59 bps). Then again, implied volatility tends to increase by 29 bps on days before FOMC 
meetings. On days when no FOMC meetings are being held, VXO faces modest increase 
of 13 bps on average. 
 
One may find resemblance when reflecting these findings on the existing literature. 
Following Chen et al. (2012), implied volatility can be perceived as a proxy for uncertainty, 
and hence the increase in VXO prior to FOMC meetings could be justified. Also, the 
documented decrease in implied volatility on FOMC meeting days is consistent with prior 
findings (Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004; Chen & Clements 2007; Vähämaa & Äijö 2011). 
Before treating the main research problem, that is the impact of FOMC meetings on 
return predictability, this paper briefly verifies the decrease in implied volatility on FOMC 
meeting days. This is done by using a plain model where daily changes in VXO are 
regressed on a dummy that indicates the FOMC meeting days: 
 
ΔVXO𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿(𝐷𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶) + 𝑡+𝑛, (15) 
 
where 
D FOMC = value 1 for FOMC announcement dates, 0 otherwise. 
 
The next chapter will present the empirical results of this paper. In practice, the main 
area of interest is to study whether the change in VXO prior to FOMC announcements 
contains more information about future stock returns than the change that is captured 




7 Empirical results 
This chapter will discuss the results of the empirical analysis conducted to examine the 
predictability of stock returns through implied volatility around FOMC announcements. 
Diverging from existing literature, research problem is treated in a market-wide context. 
The chosen methodologies rest upon previous related studies and the empirical 
framework presented in chapter 6. 
 
As discussed in section 1.2, the existing research studying the information contained in 
implied volatility is mostly based on two principles. First, option prices are expected to 
incorporate information not yet reflected in underlying stock prices (Cremers & 
Weinbaum 2010). Second, the option trading volumes are believed to cluster around 
occasions involving asymmetric information, as exhibited by Cao and Ou-Yang (2009). 
Given these presumptions, the following results are expected to extend the analysis of 
Du et al. (2018) by providing empirical evidence to support the predicting power of 
implied volatility around FOMC announcements. Furthermore, due to the nature of 
these regressions, the results are expected to be on par with Du et al. (2018) regarding 
the modest coefficients of determination. 
 
The following tables present the results formed by utilizing the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. Each table consists of three panels: Panel A for full sample and separate 
panels for subsamples 1995–2001 and 2002–2008, Panel B and Panel C respectively. 
Before treating the main research problem, the impact of FOMC meetings on implied 
volatility is briefly documented in table (6). However, most emphasis is put on results 
related to return predictability around FOMC meetings, that is from table (7) onwards. 
In each of these tables, results are presented for not only all observations in the group, 







Table 6. The impact of FOMC meetings on implied volatility, 1995–2008. For all intercepts and 
coefficients, their respective p-values are reported in parentheses below. The significance levels 




As expected, the results reported in table (6) confirm the significant decrease in implied 
volatility on FOMC meeting days. For the full sample of 3642 daily observations, the 
coefficient estimate for dummy variable indicating FOMC meetings is negative at -0.024 
and significant at the 1 % level. In other words, the occurrence of a FOMC meeting leads 
to a 2.4 % same day decrease in VXO. The coefficient estimates remain significant for 
both subsamples as well. Panel B indicates that between 1995–2001, FOMC meetings 
result in a VXO decrease of -3.0 %, significant at the 1 % level. For another subsample, 
the documented decrease is -1.8 %, significant at the 5 % level. In general, the results in 
table (6) are similar across the sample and one can thereby conclude that uncertainty 
generally decreases after FOMC meetings. Again, these results are reported just to 
ground the main analysis of this paper and to further authenticate the previous findings 
on this matter (Nikkinen & Sahlström 2004; Chen & Clements 2007; Vähämaa & Äijö 
2011). 
 
Regarding the chosen research problem, table (7) is of great interest as it presents the 
results of the regression in which daily OEX returns are explained by not only the lagged 
changes in VXO, but also the dummy variables indicating the FOMC meeting days. 
 
 
Intercept R Square N
Panel A: Full sample
0.001 -0.024 *** 0.005 3 642
(0.296) (0.000)
Panel B: 1995-2001
0.001 -0.030 *** 0.009 1 819
(0.404) (0.000)
Panel C: 2002-2008
0.001 -0.018 ** 0.003 1 823
(0.512) (0.026)
𝛿    
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Table 7. OEX returns explained by changes in VXO on FOMC meeting days, 1995–2008. For all 
intercepts and coefficients, their respective p-values are reported in parentheses below. The 




In table (7), Panel A exhibits the full sample results. Regarding all observations, the 
coefficient estimate for previous-day changes in VXO is positive (0.010) and significant 
at the 1 % level. Thus, holding other factors fixed, any changes in VXO are positively and 
significantly associated with the following day OEX returns. Also, the FOMC dummy 
variable is positive (0.003) and significant at the 5 % level, implying positive yet modest 
influence on subsequent stock returns. However, the interaction dummy between VXO 
Quartiles All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.619)
0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 *** 0.010 ***
(0.355) (0.700) (0.661) (0.006) (0.002)
0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.006 ** 0.003 **
(0.138) (0.444) (0.767) (0.018) (0.013)
0.018 0.017 -0.024 -0.027 -0.005
(0.517) (0.307) (0.439) (0.403) (0.754)
R Square 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.017 0.004
Number of observations 910 911 911 910 3 642
Panel B: 1995-2001
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129)
0.004 -0.016 *** -0.004 -0.036 *** 0.000
(0.589) (0.007) (0.416) (0.000) (0.937)
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 ***
(0.311) (0.478) (0.468) (0.751) (0.001)
0.035 0.049 -0.084 0.209 0.076 **
(0.296) (0.138) (0.336) (0.195) (0.012)
R Square 0.007 0.019 0.005 0.037 0.009
Number of observations 439 462 468 450 1 819
Panel C: 2002-2008
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.012 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.510)
0.006 0.009 * 0.001 -0.005 0.019 ***
(0.453) (0.074) (0.847) (0.632) (0.000)
0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 * 0.001
(0.261) (0.728) (0.310) (0.053) (0.501)
0.000 0.002 -0.024 -0.040 -0.038 *
(0.997) (0.932) (0.466) (0.281) (0.084)
R Square 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.009












changes and FOMC meetings is insignificant and thereby supports H0. These results 
suggest that even though stock returns are positively affected by FOMC meetings and 
lagged changes in implied volatility, their predictability through VXO does not necessarily 
increase around FOMC meetings. 
 
However, the subsamples reported in Panel B and Panel C document slightly differing 
results. Between 1995–2001, the coefficient estimate for FOMC meeting variable is 
highly significant, implying positive impact on same day stock returns. Moreover, also 
the interaction dummy is positive and significant at the 5 % level. The estimate for lagged 
changes in VXO fails to be significant. These results in Panel B indicate that even though 
the predicting power of implied volatility cannot be verified for the full subsample, it 
significantly increases on FOMC meeting days between 1995–2001. 
 
Panel C exhibits the results for the latter subsample 2002–2008. Contrary to Panel B, the 
lagged VXO variable is positive and significant, thereby suggesting that the full sample 
significance in lagged VXO is driven by the last seven years. The interaction dummy is 
significant as well, although negative and thus implying a decrease in stock return 
predictability on FOMC meeting days. The FOMC meeting dummy is insignificant 
between 2002–2008. This variability brings on challenges in making flawless conclusions 
about the results. 
 
Regarding the intercept term for all observations, the expected mean return is zero when 
all independent variables have zero values. Following the negative correlation between 
implied volatility and the stock market, mean return is positive (negative) when implied 
volatility decreases (increases). Table (7) also presents the regression results for different 
quartiles of daily changes in VXO. As mentioned, quartile 1 contains days with big 
declines in implied volatility, whereas quartile 4 consists of days with sharp daily 




The VXO coefficient turns from positive to negative when moving from big daily declines 
to sharp increases. Examining quartile 4, this coefficient is negative and highly significant 
for both the full sample and the subsample 1995–2001. This finding is in line with 
previous studies about the negative correlation between stock returns and implied 
volatility. Furthermore, table (7) implies that regarding quartile 4, the FOMC meeting 
variable is negative and significant at the 5 % (10 %) for the full sample (subsample 2002–
2008). These results suggest that a big increase in implied volatility affects stock returns 
more negatively on FOMC meeting days than on regular trading days. 
 
Following the presented methodology, similar regression is performed with an altered 
dummy variable that indicates the days after FOMC meetings instead of the actual 
meeting days. Still, the generic framework of regressing daily stock returns on the 
preceding changes in implied volatility remains the same. The t+1 dummy is motivated 
by Du et al. (2018) and results in table (6), both reporting significant decrease in VXO on 
FOMC meeting days. The results for t+1 regression are presented in table (8). 
 
Table (8) exhibits that considering all observations and full sample period, the FOMC t+1 
meeting dummy and the interaction variable both have positive and significant effect on 
stock returns, indicating that return predictability is higher on days after FOMC meetings 
than on non-meeting days (reference group). This perception is supported by positive 
estimate for the lagged changes in implied volatility, significant at the 5 % level. 
 
The relations presented above are arguably driven by the subsample 2002-2008: the 
respective coefficient estimates in Panel C are even more positive while maintaining high 
significance. For the first subsample 1995–2001, each coefficient estimate fails to be 
significant. Nevertheless, contrary to results documented in table (7), these results 
support H1 by implying that stock return predictability through VXO increases on days 
following the FOMC meetings. Furthermore, these observations verify that stock returns 
are positively affected by not only days following the FOMC meetings, but also the lagged 
changes in implied volatility. This finding is in line with the ones reported in table (7). 
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Table 8. OEX returns explained by changes in VXO on days following the meetings, 1995–2008. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. The significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as 




Looking at the quartile regressions in table (8), one may find similarities to the results in 
table (7) as most of the coefficient estimates are insignificant. Regarding the full sample 
results in Panel A, lagged VXO variable is significant for quartile 4 only. Again, this 
illustrates that sheer increases in implied volatility often lead to negative stock returns. 
On the contrary, the dummy variable indicating days after the FOMC meetings is positive 
and significant only for quartiles 1 and 2, that is when implied volatility decreases. 
Quartiles All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.012 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.542)
0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.022 *** 0.008 **
(0.745) (0.835) (0.460) (0.001) (0.013)
0.003 * 0.003 ** 0.000 -0.002 0.003 ***
(0.060) (0.029) (0.743) (0.432) (0.004)
0.096 *** 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.054 ***
(0.000) (0.480) (0.284) (0.608) (0.001)
R Square 0.019 0.005 0.002 0.012 0.007
Number of observations 910 911 911 910 3 642
Panel B: 1995-2001
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.010 *** 0.001 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.057)
0.004 -0.016 *** -0.004 -0.035 *** 0.002
(0.576) (0.008) (0.429) (0.000) (0.748)
0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.002
(0.617) (0.158) (0.775) (0.250) (0.291)
0.094 0.036 -0.024 -0.006 0.009
(0.194) (0.176) (0.619) (0.897) (0.765)
R Square 0.006 0.020 0.002 0.034 0.001
Number of observations 439 462 468 450 1 819
Panel C: 2002-2008
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.013 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.391)
0.000 0.009 * -0.001 -0.012 0.014 ***
(0.982) (0.055) (0.789) (0.247) (0.004)
0.005 * 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004 **
(0.067) (0.104) (0.889) (0.982) (0.026)
0.092 *** -0.007 0.033 0.029 0.069 ***
(0.002) (0.838) (0.140) (0.518) (0.001)
R Square 0.028 0.014 0.005 0.003 0.015







𝛿𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶 𝑡+1
𝛿𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶 𝑡+1
𝛿𝑉𝑋𝑂 𝑥 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶 𝑡+1
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It is not only the FOMC dummy variable but also the interaction variable that appears to 
be driven by big declines in implied volatility – quartile 1 is the only quartile with a 
significant full sample estimate, and that is the case for the subsample 2002–2008 as 
well. In addition to this observation, no major remarks arise from the quartile results in 
table (8). As anticipated, all quartile intercepts are significant implying the expected OEX 
development excluding all other variables. 
 
Motivated by the significant findings17 of Du et al. (2018), this thesis considers both 
scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meetings. This regression follows equation (13) and 
its results are reported in table (9). Similar to the results presented earlier, the full 
sample impact of lagged VXO changes on daily OEX returns is positive and highly 
significant. The full sample coefficient of dummy variable that indicates scheduled FOMC 
meetings is positive and significant as well, suggesting more positive OEX returns on days 
with scheduled FOMC meetings compared to days when no meetings are being held. For 
unscheduled meetings, the respective coefficient fails to be significant. 
 
In terms of significance, the full sample results differ when examining the interaction 
variables in table (9). For unscheduled meetings, the full sample estimate of interaction 
variable is significant and negative, thereby suggesting a decrease in return predictability 
on days of unscheduled FOMC meetings. This observation is inconsistent with the full-
sample results presented in other tables. The respective coefficient for scheduled 
meetings fails to be significant. These findings suggest that even though stock returns 
are positively affected by meetings that are scheduled, the full sample return 
predictability does not behave in a similar manner when meetings are divided into 





17 Utilizing the lagged implied volatility spreads within the banking sector, Du et al. (2018) report significant 
interaction variables for both scheduled and unscheduled meetings. 
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Table 9. FOMC meetings divided into scheduled and scheduled, 1995–2008. Blank values denote 
variables for which the estimate cannot be computed as there are not enough observations in 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.619)
0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 *** 0.010 ***
(0.355) (0.699) (0.661) (0.006) (0.002)
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 ***
(0.583) (0.671) (0.953) (0.970) (0.010)
0.008 ** 0.007 * -0.014 * -0.019 *** 0.003
(0.037) (0.088) (0.098) (0.005) (0.256)
0.009 0.012 -0.027 0.055 0.025
(0.763) (0.495) (0.404) (0.301) (0.224)
0.027 0.094 * -0.227 0.006 -0.081 **
(0.645) (0.095) (0.193) (0.916) (0.016)
R Square 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.026 0.006
Number of observations 910 911 911 910 3 642
Panel B: 1995-2001
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128)
0.004 -0.016 *** -0.004 -0.036 *** 0.000
(0.582) (0.007) (0.415) (0.000) (0.937)
-0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.325) (0.531) (0.467) (0.748) (0.122)
0.015 *** 0.004 0.010 0.019 ***
(0.001) (0.769) (0.353) (0.000)
0.001 0.052 -0.084 0.209 0.049
(0.974) (0.169) (0.336) (0.195) (0.149)
0.102 0.074 0.184 ***
(0.188) (0.665) (0.005)
R Square 0.049 0.019 0.016 0.038 0.020
Number of observations 439 462 468 450 1 819
Panel C: 2002-2008
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.012 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.508)
0.006 0.009 * 0.001 -0.005 0.019 ***
(0.454) (0.073) (0.847) (0.628) (0.000)
0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.004 **
(0.154) (0.881) (0.535) (0.722) (0.038)
-0.002 0.013 ** -0.014 -0.033 *** -0.007 *
(0.768) (0.044) (0.102) (0.000) (0.087)
0.012 -0.006 -0.023 0.025 0.010
(0.809) (0.778) (0.504) (0.670) (0.702)
-0.021 -0.230 0.083 -0.098 **
(0.803) (0.187) (0.213) (0.022)
R Square 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.044 0.018


















When examining all observations in two subsamples, the results are relatively similar. 
The interaction variables that account for unscheduled meetings are significant in both 
subsamples. However, the coefficient is positive (0.184) between 1995–2001 and 
negative (-0.098) from 2002 onwards. Contrary to the full sample results, the dummies 
for unscheduled meeting are significant in both subsamples, but again with differing 
signs. The modest yet still positive stock returns associated with scheduled FOMC 
meetings are driven by the latter subsample, as Panel C reports positive and highly 
significant estimate for scheduled meetings. Moreover, also the positive impact of 
lagged VXO changes on daily OEX returns appears to occur only in the latter subsample: 
between 2002–2008, the VXO estimate is positive and significant at the 1 % level, 
whereas the respective estimate for all observations between 1995–2001 fails to be 
significant. 
 
Regarding the quartile regressions in table (9), it is worth noticing that the full sample 
estimate of the dummy indicating unscheduled meetings is significant across all quartiles 
but fails to reach significance when accounting for all observations. These coefficient 
estimates behave in a similar manner with the lagged VXO estimates as they again turn 
from positive to negative when moving from daily declines to increases in implied 
volatility. However, the full sample VXO estimate is significant only in quartile 4. 
 
As reported in Panel B and Panel C of table (9), the coefficient estimate of scheduled 
FOMC meetings fails to be significant across all quartiles in both subsamples. On the 
contrary, some of the quartile estimates that designate unscheduled meetings are 
significant. Finally, table (10) reports the results of a regression that follows equation (14) 








Table 10. OEX returns explained by changes in VXO on days within the 3-day windows, 1995–
2008. The significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as ***, ** and * respectively. P-




Results are relatively similar compared to ones reported in tables (7) and (8). For the full 
sample regression, the impact of lagged VXO changes on stock returns is positive and 
significant. The coefficient estimate of the three-day dummy is positive and significant 
as well. Moreover, also the full sample interaction variable is positive and significant, 
implying higher return predictability around FOMC announcements. This perception is 
in line with the positive and significant interaction variable reported in Panel A of table 
Quartiles All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.893)
0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019 *** 0.008 **
(0.821) (0.708) (0.431) (0.007) (0.021)
0.003 ** 0.002 ** 0.001 -0.004 *** 0.002 ***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.108) (0.003) (0.001)
0.036 ** 0.010 0.014 -0.023 0.021 **
(0.016) (0.399) (0.285) (0.274) (0.036)
R Square 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.020 0.007
Number of observations 910 911 911 910 3 642
Panel B: 1995-2001
Intercept 0.011 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 *** -0.011 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.498)
0.004 -0.018 *** -0.004 -0.036 *** 0.000
(0.586) (0.004) (0.421) (0.000) (0.966)
0.002 0.002 ** 0.002 ** -0.001 0.004 ***
(0.229) (0.038) (0.038) (0.739) (0.000)
0.016 0.034 * 0.000 0.017 0.028 *
(0.457) (0.056) (0.996) (0.689) (0.086)
R Square 0.006 0.028 0.011 0.032 0.011
Number of observations 439 462 468 450 1 819
Panel C: 2002-2008
Intercept 0.010 *** 0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.012 *** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.441)
-0.001 0.010 * -0.002 -0.004 0.015 ***
(0.930) (0.053) (0.763) (0.701) (0.003)
0.004 ** 0.001 0.000 -0.006 *** 0.001
(0.035) (0.262) (0.972) (0.004) (0.430)
0.046 ** -0.007 0.017 -0.043 * 0.016
(0.028) (0.629) (0.277) (0.093) (0.243)
R Square 0.024 0.011 0.003 0.023 0.008












(8). In other words, the increase in return predictability associated with preceding 
changes in volatility is significant for not only days following the meetings, but also for 
the full three-day time windows around the meetings. In table (7), which reports the 
results of the actual meeting days, the respective interaction variable is positive and 
significant for subsample 1995–2001. However, the full sample variable is negative and 
fails to be significant. 
 
Panel B in table (10) reports that for all observations between 1995–2001, the three-day 
dummy variable is slightly positive and highly significant whereas the interaction dummy 
implies significance at the 10 % level. Regarding the latter subsample reported in Panel 
C, only the lagged VXO variable is significant when considering all observations. The full 
sample quartile results in Panel A show that apart from quartile 3, the estimate of the 
three-day dummy variable remains significant. Furthermore, the three-day estimate 
turns from positive to negative when moving from quartile 1 to quartile 4, thereby 
behaving like the actual FOMC meeting dummy in table (7). With reference to the full 
sample interaction variable, it appears to be driven by sudden decreases in implied 
volatility as the only quartile with a significant coefficient estimate is quartile 1. 
 
It is interesting to reflect the full sample quartile results against the subsample results 
presented in Panel B and Panel C. Regarding the three-day dummy variable between 
1995–2001, its coefficient estimates are significant for quartiles 2 and 3. On the contrary, 
the latter subsample 2002–2008 reports significant results for quartiles 1 and 4. Similar 
to the results presented earlier, the coefficient estimates turn from positive to negative 
when moving from negative to positive changes in implied volatility. 
 
It is mentioned earlier that the interaction variable would be driven by observations in 
quartile 1, that is the sharp declines in market uncertainty. However, this appears to be 
the case only in the full sample regression as the subsample estimates in table (10) imply 
somewhat differing results: the quartile 1 estimate is significant only in the latter 
subsample and moreover, there are significant estimates for other quartiles as well. 
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All in all, the findings about the return predictability associated with implied volatility 
differ between the implemented models. As hypothesized, it is discovered that return 
predictability increases around FOMC announcements. However, these kinds of results 
are attained only when the model considers either the days after the announcements or 
certain subsamples. Furthermore, the coefficients of determination remain at modest 
level regardless of the model used. This is consistent with e.g. Du et al. (2018) and is 
caused by the nature of these regressions. The intercept terms behave in a similar 
manner across all models: the intercept is zero for all observations, and it turns positive 
(negative) when implied volatility decreases (increases). 
 
Even though the significance of the chosen variables varies between the models, there are 
some outlines that apply to each model. Moreover, there arguably is analogy between the 
results of this paper and the findings presented in earlier research. The following chapter 
concludes this thesis by discussing the results in further detail and reflecting them 




For decades, volatility has been a common subject in financial research. As many 
financial models consider financial risk to equal volatility, market participants have 
absorbed volatility as a key measure of uncertainty. However, it has been later 
discovered that besides designating the computational level of risk, the forward-looking 
measures of volatility may have informational value over future equity returns (Chen et 
al., 2012; Du et al., 2018). 
 
Acknowledging the findings mentioned above, this thesis examines whether the 
information contained in implied volatility increases around FOMC announcements. In 
practice, this thesis examines whether implied volatility includes more information 
about future stock returns around FOMC announcements than it usually does. The 
methods used in this thesis replicate closely the study conducted by Du et al. (2018). 
However, Du et al. (2018) treat the subject mostly within the banking sector. Therefore, 
this thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the chosen subject in a 
market-wide environment. 
 
Prior to examining the informational role of implied volatility, this thesis verifies the 
already established decrease in implied volatility on FOMC meeting days. By regressing 
daily changes in implied volatility on a dummy variable indicating FOMC meeting days, a 
negative and significant relationship is discovered. The significance of this relationship 
holds in full sample regression as well as in both subsamples. This is consistent with 
previous studies (Nikkinen & Sahlström, 2004; Vähämaa & Äijö, 2011; Chen et al., 2012). 
 
After confirming the post-FOMC decrease in implied volatility, the empirical analysis 
focuses on the relationship between implied volatility and stock returns around FOMC 
announcements. It is discovered that stock returns are positively affected by lagged 
changes in implied volatility around FOMC meeting days. Furthermore, the lagged VXO 
variable appears to be driven by quartile 4 that has negative and highly significant 
coefficient estimate. This is line with the existing literature about the negative 
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correlation between implied volatility and the stock market (Whaley, 2000; Dash & 
Moran, 2005; Carr & Wu, 2006). These results are nearly similar in each model deployed 
in this thesis. 
 
It is also discovered that daily stock returns are positively associated with FOMC meeting 
days. Apart from the variable that designates the unscheduled meetings (see equation 
13), each dummy variable indicating FOMC meetings or their surrounding days is slightly 
positive and highly significant. Again, one can find similarities when reflecting these 
findings against the existing literature. Following Chen et al. (2012), implied volatility 
indices can be considered as proxies for market uncertainty. When implied volatility 
declines on FOMC meeting days, market uncertainty is perceived to abate. Given the 
negative correlation between implied volatility and the stock market, stocks may 
therefore generate higher return on FOMC meeting days than they usually do. 
 
This thesis puts most emphasis on examining the predicting power of implied volatility. 
The initial results suggest that as the full sample interaction variable is insignificant on 
FOMC meeting days, stock return predictability associated with implied volatility does 
not increase around FOMC meetings. On the other hand, the interaction variables turn 
significant when similar regressions are performed on two subsamples. Furthermore, 
significant interaction variables are obtained when FOMC meetings are divided into 
scheduled and unscheduled meetings. However, these interaction variables imply 
contingency as their sign changes between the subsamples, which is inconsistent with 
the findings of Du et al. (2018). Therefore, these results alone are inadequate for 
rejecting H0. 
 
However, when deferring the three-day time window by one day, return predictability 
associated with implied volatility increases significantly. Moreover, it is discovered that 
this return predictability is driven by the subsample 2002–2008. As the financial markets 
faced high information asymmetry during that period, these results are consistent with 
the findings of Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) about the clustering of options trading around 
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events that involve information asymmetry and moral hazard. Similar results about the 
increase in return predictability can be found when the model is altered to consider all 
days within the three-day windows instead of single announcement days. These results 
together provide evidence against H0. 
 
To conclude, the results of this thesis have several implications. First, it is verified that 
implied volatility decreases on FOMC meeting days. Second, the results suggest that 
stock returns are positively associated with both the lagged changes in implied volatility 
and FOMC meetings in general. These findings are in line with the previous studies. 
Regarding the hypothesized increase in return predictability, significant results are 
attained when the model is altered to take either certain subsamples or days following 
the FOMC meetings into account. However, as these results are not flawless, one cannot 
directly apply the findings of Du et al. (2018) to a market-wide context that utilizes 
indices instead of individual stocks. 
 
There are numerous suggestions for further research. For example, one might attain 
more immaculate results by sidelining the volatility indices and computing the changes 
directly from the index options. Furthermore, future research could contrast with Chen 
et al. (2012) and treat implied volatility as a proxy for sentiment rather than pure 
uncertainty. In practice, this could mean supplementing the model with additional 
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